Éire’s neutrality and its impact on relations during the war - CCEA

The day after Britain declared war on Germany, Éamon de Valera confirmed Éire’s neutrality.

Although many in Éire sympathised with the Allied cause, neutrality was popular.

The majority of the population supported neutrality because it was a British, not an Irish, war.

Many believed neutrality was a good way of asserting their independence from Britain.

They also hoped it might save Ireland from the horrors of modern warfare.

Even Ireland’s unionist minority supported neutrality, whilst still backing the Allied war effort.

Only a small number of people advocated abandoning neutrality.

This number increased when the USA joined the war in December 1941, but it was never a widespread opinion.

Although Winston Churchill had warned that Éire's co-operation with Britain in a war was unlikely, many expected Éire would help, and in particular let Britain use the former treaty ports and other military bases.

The British only accepted Éire's neutrality reluctantly.

They wanted to end it as:

• Britain was suffering heavy shipping losses in the Atlantic. Re-routing British merchant ships to ports in Northern Ireland, instead of using ports in Éire, was placing a great strain on the vital supply route across the Atlantic.
• Britain was worried that Germany might invade Éire and use it as a ‘stepping stone’ from which to attack Britain.
• Éire did not have blackout regulations. Therefore, Northern Ireland was an easily identifiable target for the Luftwaffe.

However, realising the importance of good communication, Sir John Maffey was appointed as the British Government’s representative to Éire.

He developed a positive relationship with de Valera.

However, British pressure to end the policy remained strong, particularly after Churchill became Prime Minister in May 1940.

There was strong resentment at Éire’s neutrality in Northern Ireland.

It was viewed as an act of betrayal and a threat to the United Kingdom’s security.

Overall, the war led to a further decline in north-south relations.

They clashed over:

• The lack of a blackout in Éire, which the unionists believed increased the probability of Northern Ireland being targeted by German bombers.
• De Valera not expelling Hempel, the German Ambassador in Dublin.
• De Valera’s campaign for clemency for Tom Williams, an IRA man sentenced to death for his part in a gun battle with police in West Belfast.
• De Valera’s repeated demands for an end to partition.
• The issue of conscription (1941).
• Workers from Éire taking what unionist regarded as their jobs in Belfast.
• Thus, by 1945 the relationship between the Northern unionists in the north and Southern nationalists was extremely hostile.

Unionists were not aware of Éire’s benevolent neutrality.

However, de Valera's quick response during the Belfast Blitz in 1941, through the supply of fire-fighters to help in Belfast, was greatly appreciated at the time.

Éire asserted its neutrality as follows:

• It refused military assistance to both sides.
• The Allies were denied the use of ports and airfields.
• News bulletins gave purely factual reports about the war.
• Weather forecasts ceased to be broadcast in case they helped either side.
• When the US entered the war, de Valera resisted US pressure to end neutrality.
• Indeed, de Valera went to great lengths to appear neutral.

He irritated Washington by protesting at the arrival of US troops in Northern Ireland.

He also annoyed Allied opinion when he expressed sympathy over Hitler’s death.

However, he had also expressed sympathy at the death of US President, Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

Frequently Dublin’s actions made it seem that its neutrality was pro-Allies.

This help was known as 'benevolent neutrality'.

Examples of this were:

• In 1943, the German ambassador’s radio transmitter was confiscated.
• German pilots who bailed out over Éire were interned; Allied airmen were allowed to cross the border into Northern Ireland,
• During the 1941 Belfast Blitz, de Valera sent fire crews from Drogheda and Dundalk to help.
• In the aftermath of the Belfast Blitz, relief centres were set up close to the border and relief funds were started.
• Allied airmen patrolling the Western Approaches or refuelling on trans-Atlantic missions could fly over Irish territory via the ‘Donegal Air Corridor’. This saved a 100-mile detour.
• Coastal navigational aids were provided for US airmen.
• Weather reports were secretly transmitted to the Allies, and proved very valuable during the D-Day landings in June 1944.
• In the final months of the war, de Valera allowed the RAF to establish secret radar bases in Éire.
• Plans were drawn up by both countries for joint co-operation if Germany invaded Éire, and for the British army based in Northern - Ireland to move into the South.
• However, all co-operation was kept secret; most members of the British and Irish government were unaware of it.

Britain made several attempts to persuade Éire to enter the war on the Allies’ side.

In June 1940, Churchill proposed ending partition in return for British forces using Éire's naval bases.

De Valera refused as:

• He was unsure if the British could be trusted to honour the decision after the war.
• He doubted that unionists could be forced into a united Ireland against their will.
• He thought Britain might lose the war, thus making the promise worthless.
• He did not want to compromise Éire's hard won independence from Britain by having British troops back in Éire.
• Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (7 December 1941), Churchill telegrammed de Valera.

His offer of 'Now is your chance. Now or never “A nation once again”’, was understood by de Valera to refer to the possibility of Irish unity if he joined the Allies.

Now is your chance. Now or never “A nation once again.”

– Winston Churchill to Éamon de Valera 1941

Again he declined.

In 1942, Churchill again attempted to regain the use of the treaty ports.

Once again, his efforts were rejected.

Britain reduced the number of its ships used both to transport goods to Éire and to protect Irish cargo vessels.

Due to neutrality, Éire was not able to access financial aid under the USA’s Lend-Lease programme.

As the war continued, Éire came under increasing pressure from both sides of the Atlantic to join the fighting.

After the USA joined the war in December 1941, President Roosevelt put pressure on Éire to join the Allies.

He felt Éire’s neutrality was detrimental to the war effort, so a media campaign portraying de Valera as pro-German was launched.

Relations deteriorated further in 1942 when, in spite of de Valera’s protests, US troops arrived in Northern Ireland to train and to help with defence.

Maintaining neutrality was difficult.

To achieve it, Éire's government did the following:

1. The Dáil used its extensive new powers under the Emergency Powers Act 1939. There was strict censorship of the press and radio. No negative comments were permitted and weather reports were not published in case they helped either side in the war.
2. De Valera used the Offences Against the State Act 1939 and the Treason Act to deal decisively with the IRA.
3. Éire ensured it received essential supplies previously brought by British ships by setting up a Ministry of Supplies under Seán Lemass.
4. Éire's defences were strengthened.